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In a New York Times article published in April 12, 2019 titled “Is America 
Hopelessly Polarized, or Just Allergic to Politics?” the authors reported that as high as 
87% of Americans think that political polarization is threatening to the American way 
of life.  Citizens tend to point to the strong partisan camps in Congress and the 
seeming demise of ‘bipartisanship.’  This situation is a far cry from what is observed 
in the 1950s  that prompted a committee of party scholars of the American Political 
Science Association to publish a document titled “Towards a More Responsible Two 
Party System.”  This document laments that American parties do not provide clear 
and meaningful choices to the voters especially when compared to its parliamentary 
counterparts. 
 
By the time Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda published their 1982 book, Parties 
and their Environment,  it seems that the advise of the APSA committee have fallen 
on deaf ears.  Harmel and Janda (1982) highlighted the unique situation of American 
politics whereby partisan voting (at least in the legislature) is rather nebulous and not 
as clear cut as the parliamentary systems such as the United Kingdom.  Since at least 
2006, however, scholars began noticing increasing cohesion in American political 
parties.  As Galston and Nivola (2006) notes, “the US Congress is more polarized 
ideologically than it was just a generation ago.  In the House of Representatives, 
ideological overlap between the political parties has all but disappeared, and the rise 
of ‘safe’ districts with partisan supermajorities has tended to push representatives 
away from the center” (p.1).   
 
Since the election of President Donald Trump in 2016, everyone – from the media to 
academia – have noted the unprecendented level of ‘hunkering down’ between 
Republicans and Democrats as well as the voting public.  For Americans that pride 
themselves about bipartisanship and ‘finding the middle,’ the politics of the last four 
years is frustrating.  Interestingly, the wish of the APSA committee may have just 
come through albeit many decades late.   
 
Within the US political science community, a cottage industry sprouted scrambling to 
explain the polarization of American politics into two camps.  Amongst these 
excellent research is a common theme best summed up by Gerald Pomper and Marc 
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Weiner (2014) when they suggest that “the partisan polarization currently dominating 
American public life is a serious threat to the long-term political health of the United 
States” (p. 129). 
 
Yet, outside of the United States ‘sticking to your camp’ is a rather common 
occurrence and is actually expected of party politicians.  In Westminster systems such 
as New Zealand, for example, partisanship at the legislative and the voter levels are 
strong and ‘crossing the aisle’ is rather rare.  In parliamentary systems, party 
polarization do not seem to carry as much negative connotation as those expressed by 
scholars of American politics (Satherley et al. 2019). 
 
In Taiwan, partisanship has been quite pronounced for quite some time – at least since 
2000 – leading scholars to also note the partisan polarization at the elite level (Hsiao 
2014, 2019; Hsiao and Cheng 2014; Tsai et al. 2007).  While bipartisanship is not 
necessarily a part of Taiwan’s political parlance as in the United States, there seems to 
be a shared sentiment regarding the baneful effects of polarization (Hsiao 2014).   
 
The variance in the views regarding party polarization, leads me to ask why the 
difference in sentiments exist.  In this exploratory paper, I examine the state of party 
polarization in Taiwan and New Zealand and offer some tentative observations of 
why the sentiments vary.  In the next section, I briefly review the extant literature 
about party polarization.  Following the brief literature review, I examine existing 




In the 2019 TIGCR international conference, Clark et al (2019) suggested that one 
defining characteristic of polarized public is that there is fairly even balance between 
the supporters of party A and party B on most issues.  This definition suggests that in 
the case of the public there is the existence of clear camps and differences in issues.  
In the case of political parties, Marc Hetherington suggests there are two features that 
characterize polarization – increased party strength, and ideologically distinct 
policies.  Paulson (2014, p. 75) notes “that in an ideologically polarized party system, 
the parties have become ideologically homogenized internally” which can be viewed 
as contributing to increased party strength.  On the second point – that of 
ideologically distinct policies – allows voters to be able to distinguish parties more 
easily.  Lupu (2015, p. 334) also shares this view stating that “the further apart the 
political parties, the easier it may be for citizens to distinguish among their electoral 
options.”   
 
Thus far, the above views of party polarization are benign.  Clear distinct 
programmatic parties help voters to identify with their preferred political parties 
making the voting calculus a lot simpler.  Plus, “party polarization implies that it 
should reflect the distribution of parties along an ideological dimension” (Dalton 
2008, p. 903) that in turn should mirror the electorate’s distribution along the 
ideological continuum.  In more than one ways, then, clear and distinct programmatic 
parties allow political parties then to perform its representative, linkage function as 
well as its interest aggregation and articulation functions.  
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In multiparty systems, polarization is a feature of the party systems as political parties 
compete to differentiate themselves from a ‘crowded electoral market,’ so to speak.  
In two-party systems, Downs (1957) suggests that political parties would tend to 
converge towards the center of a single ideological continuum.   The centripetal 
forces would force these parties to move to the center presumably capturing the large 
number of median voters in this single-peak ideological continuum.  This would 
imply that polarization can be affected by the number of competitive political parties.  
Due to this, past studies have used the number of competitive political parties as a 
surrogate for polarization. 
 
As Dalton (2008) correctly argues that while the increase in the number of 
competitive political parties may contribute to polarization it may not be necessarily 
so.  Assume two countries (country A and B) with four competitive political parties 
each and the parties are arrayed along a single dimension as below: 
 
Figure 1. Placement of multiple parties on L-R scale and polarization 
 
Country I 
   A B  C D 





 A  C    B   D 
Left     Center     Right 
 
Referring to figure 1, the two largest parties (C, D) of country I are next to each other 
in the ideological spectrum while for country J the two largest parties (C, D) are much 
further apart.  From this example, we can discern that the numbers of parties alone do 
not provide enough information regarding party polarization.  In both cases – 
countries I and J – there are four competitive political parties (two large parties and 
two smaller ones) in the legislature.  Yet, in one country (I) the party system is less 
polarized vis-à-vis the other (J).   
 
Although party system fragmentation may be similar for both country I and country J, 
party polarization is different as the gap between the two largest parties – party C and 
party D – is much smaller in country I than in country J.  As Lupu (2015, p. 332) 
states, that “from a rationalistic perspective, polarization implies that the utility 
differential between parties increases,” which we can definitely observe in the case of 
country J in figure 1.   
 
Now let us consider three countries (X, Y, Z) with two parties each (A, B) each with 
different placement of the two parties as in figure 2.  For country X, parties A and B 
are side by side on the left-right scale.  Country Y also has two parties that can be 
described as challenger parties and stacked in the same placement in the same left-




Figure 2. Party placement of 2-parties on a L-R scale 
 
Country X 
     AB 
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     B 





   A    B 
Left     Center     Right 
 
For these three hypothetical cases, country Z’s parties are furthest apart and allows 
their electorate to distinguish between the two parties.  Indeed, we are more likely to 
claim that Z’s party system is more polarized that X’s and Y’s. Comparing the 
multiparty systems and the two-party systems (figures 1 and 2), it is important to note 
that it is not necessarily the number of parties in a party system that leads to 
polarization but instead it is the placement of the political parties in the ideological 
continuum.  The further apart the political parties are from each other, the more 
polarized they are. 
 
One other important dimension that we also need to consider is the distribution of the 
electorate along the ideological continuum.  Dalton (2008) notes that the placement of 
these parties often times mirror the voter’s distribution along the continuum.  In fact, 
the ‘size’ of the political parties along this ideological continuum is a good indication 
of the proportion of the electorate in that particular ‘spot’ where the parties occupy.  
Even assuming a single-peaked distribution of the electorate, it is not a stretched to 
consider that there is variation in skewness and kurtosis of the voter distribution 
across democratic political systems.  Needless to say, bimodal distribution of voters 
provides a different environment for political parties in their function as linkage 
mechanism to civil society and the state. 
 
On the idea of linkage mechanism, the above discussion has implications to who 
represents the voters.  Indeed, in studies on the calculus of voting, the extant literature 
consistently finds – amongst others – that voters will vote for political parties that are 
closest to them on an issue or ideological position.  In terms of distance between the 
electorate and political parties, what is observed in a two-party system and a 
multiparty system will be different.  A cursory inspection of the hypothetical cases in 
figure 1 and figure 2 above show that for a multiparty system, the ideological distance 
between a particular voter and a political party is likely to be small given that there 
are more political parties spread out in the ideological continuum.  In contrast, there is 
a non-trivial proportion of voters whose distance from their ‘closest’ party is quite 
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significant.  In terms of two-party systems, when political parties move away from the 
example of country X and Y in figure 2 to country Z’s situation, the divergence and 
consolidation of party position becomes alarming (Crotty 2014; Pomper and Weiner 
2014; Abramowitz and McCoy 2019), though this ‘alarm’ is not a sentiment 
universally shared by multiparty parliamentary systems. 
 
In the case of Taiwan and New Zealand, there also seem to be a variance in the 
attention paid to the topic of political polarization.  Since 1996 when New Zealand 
switched from the first-past-the-post (FPP) electoral system to the mixed-member 
proportional representation (MMP) system, there is scant attention paid to the topic of 
political polarization.  Indeed, a cursory survey of recent publications in New 
Zealand’s main political science journal shows only one recent academic paper 
written on the topic (Satherley et al 2020).  By comparison, there are more attention 
paid on political polarization in Taiwan and there is more expression of concern about 
the consequences of political polarization (Hsiao 2014, 2019; Hsiao and Cheng 2014; 
Tsai et al. 2007).   
 
Political polarization in Taiwan and New Zealand by most measures are relatively 
high in both countries.  Hsiao (2014) finds that political polarization has appeared in 
Taiwan at least since 2000 – with the first executive turnover – and has continually 
increased.  Although Dalton (2008), using CSES data, finds that Taiwan’s party 
polarization level is low, Hsiao and Cheng (2014) correctly argues that Dalton’s 
application of the left-right continuum in the case of Taiwan actually masked the 
polarized nature of Taiwan’s party system.  For Taiwan, the independence-unification 
cleavage is the most salient divide in Taiwan’s political landscape.  In the case of 
New Zealand, polarization does exist in many political and social issues that confront 
the country (Satherley et al 2020) although there is less expression of concern about 
its consequences.   
 
In sum, polarization can be viewed from various dimensions.  We can view 
polarization by examining the placement of political parties along a salient ideological 
continuum and its relation to the number of parties and its fractionalization.  We can 
view polarization via ideological homogeneity and party cohesion in the legislature.  
And lastly we can also view polarization from the viewpoint of the electorate and how 
they relate to their political parties.  In the next section, I briefly describe the data and 
method I employ for exploring the status of political polarization in New Zealand and 
Taiwan that may help us uncover why there is a difference in sentiments about the 
matter. 
 
Data and Method 
 
As mentioned, in the previous section, political polarization is considered high in both 
Taiwan and in New Zealand.  But why is it that in Taiwan there is more expression of 
alarm while in New Zealand there has hardly been any attention paid to it?  To help us 
explore the status of political polarization in these two countries.  I used data from the 
New Zealand Election Studies for 2011, 2014, and 2017.  The NZES 2011 survey is a 
post-election mail survey that with the recommended weighting has an N of 2475.  
The NZES 2014 survey has an N of 2835 while the NZES 2017 survey has an N of 
3445.  For the Taiwan data, I used multiple years from the Taiwan Election and 
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Democratization Survey (TEDS)2 as well as the 2018 Taiwan Institute of Governance 
and Communications Research Survey.3   
 
To calculate the party polarization index, I referred to Dalton’s (2008) suggested 
formula to calculate party polarization.  For this index, 0 indicate no polarization 
when political parties occupy the same ideological position and 10 indicate high 
polarization when parties occupy the extremes. 
 
 





For the New Zealand data, I simplified the calculation by only employing the two 
large parties for the polarization index scores.  In the NZES survey, respondents were 
asked how they rate the political parties in a left-right scale.  As per the Dalton 
formula, I used the average of the respondents’ party left-right score.  For the party 
vote share I used the vote share of the political parties in the respective elections.  
These figures were obtained from the NZ Electoral Commission. 
 
For the Taiwan data, I follow Hsiao and Cheng’s (2014) suggestion to employ the 
unification-independence continuum as the more appropriate spectrum in the case of 
Taiwan.  In TEDS and TIGCR surveys, respondents were asked to place the political 
parties on the unification-independence scale.  I used the average score from the all 
respondents as the party score on the unification-independence scale.  The party vote 
share was obtained from the Central Election Commission using the vote the parties 
received for their party vote. 
 
Besides ideological dispersion of the party system, I also obtained data for the 
effective number of parliamentary parties as well as the fragmentation index of the 
parties in parliament.  These indices give us an additional tool to view and compare 




                                               
2 Data analyzed in this paper are from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study 2008, 2012, 2016, 
2020. The coordinator of multi-year project TEDS is Professor Chi Huang (National Chengchi 
University). More information is on TEDS website (http://www.tedsnet.org).  The author appreciates 
the assistance in providing data by the institute and individual(s) aforementioned. The author alone 
responsible for views expressed herein.  
 
3 Data analyzed in this paper are from Taiwan Institute for Governance and Communication Research 
(TIGCR), 2018: Political Polarization Survey (TIGCR-PPS 2018). The principal investigators of multi-
year project TIGCR are Professor Chi Huang (National Chengchi University) and Professor 
Chingching Chang (National Chengchi University). TIGCR-PPS 2018 is the first-year Face-to-Face 
interview survey data of the TIGCR citizen’s panel survey on “Political attitude, Policy-making and 
Governance Communication in Taiwan”. The principal investigators are Professor Chi Huang and 
Professor Chingching Chang. More information is on TIGCR website (http://tigcr.nccu.edu.tw/). The 
author appreciates the assistance in providing data by the institute and individual(s) aforementioned. 
The author alone responsible for views expressed herein. DOI：10.6923/TW-TIGCR-PPS2018 
(For more archives: https://tigcr.nccu.edu.tw/en/survey-search) 
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Effective number of parliamentary party (Ns) is calculated as: 
 





Fragmentation index (Fs) is calculated as: 
 





For both Ns and Fs, I chose the simplest calculation by only looking at the two largest 
parties in the parliament rather than all of the political parties in parliament.  While 
including all political parties that have gained seats will provide a more precise Ns 
and Fs score, for the purposes of this study the gains from precision is not substantial 
to affect the general inferences. 
 
Voter self-placement scores for New Zealand and Taiwan were obtained from both 
NZES, TEDS, and TIGCR surveys.  In these surveys, respondents were asked how 
they place themselves in scale from 0 to 11.  In the case of New Zealand, respondents 
placed themselves on a left-right scale.  For Taiwan, I used the independence-
unification scale for the voter self-placement. 
 
Comparing Polarization in NZ and Taiwan 
 
What is the status of political polarization in New Zealand and Taiwan?  Why is it 
that in New Zealand polarization has raised fewer eyebrows than in Taiwan?  Using 
the measures proposed by Dalton (2008) and Hsiao and Cheng (2014), table 1 and 
table 2 provide the polarization index, effective number of parliament parties, and 
fragmentation index for New Zealand and Taiwan. 
 
Table 1.  New Zealand data 
  Polarization Index  Ns  Fragmentation Index 
1996   3.81 
2002   3.35   3.64   0.73 
2008   3.33   2.79   0.64 
2011   3.84   2.99   0.67 
2014   3.88   3.23   0.69 
Source: CSES Party System Polarization Index for CSES Modules 1-4; NZ Electoral Commission and 
author’s calculation 
 
Looking at table 1, we can see that the polarization index for New Zealand has stayed 
relatively constant since the introduction of MMP.  In 1996, polarization index was at 
3.81 with dips in 2002 and 2008 but returned to its levels above 3.80.  It is important 
to note that according to Dalton’s (2008) polarization index if PI = 0 then there is no 
polarization while if PI = 10 the parties are extremely polarized.  From a comparative 
context, the CSES data on party system polarization for modules 1-4, have PI scores 
recorded from a low of 0.10 (Brazil 2014) and a high of 5.85 (Hungary 2002).  The 
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average polarization index in the dataset is 3.25.   From these comparative figures, we 
can infer that New Zealand’s polarization index is above the CSES average and its 
party system can be considered quite polarized.   
 
Effective number of parliamentary parties (Ns) in New Zealand has remained around 
3.0 weighted parties with National, Labour, Greens, and New Zealand First having 
had consistent representation in parliament since MMP.4  For the Greens and New 
Zealand First, voter support fluctuates from 6 percent to 11 percent in most elections, 
solidifying their status as a small party.  In New Zealand, there is prevalence of 
micro-parties since MMP due to the structural incentives as identified by Shugart and 
Tan (2016).   The prevalence of smaller parties since MMP and the higher Ns have 
seen NZ parliament more fragmented.  Coalition governments are the norm in New 
Zealand since 1996.    
 
Turning our attention to the Taiwan data on table 2 gives us a comparison with New 
Zealand.  Dalton’s (2008) data provides an interesting picture of Taiwan’s 
polarization when it reported 1.18 for 1996 and 1.14 for 2001.  This would indicate 
that Taiwan party system polarization is extremely low.  Hsiao and Cheng (2014) 
argue, however, that if the independence-unification spectrum is employed to place 
Taiwan parties it would provide a different picture of Taiwan’s level of party system 
polarization.  For example, using the TEDS 2012 data on voter placement of the KMT 
and the DPP on the economic development versus environmental protection spectrum, 
voters placed the DPP at 5.46 (weighted mean) and the KMT at 6.82 with a range of 
1.36.5 In contrast, on the independence to unification scale, the DPP is placed at 2.17, 
the KMT at 7.41 translating to a large range of 5.54.6 Independence-unification scale 
is, indeed, still the most salient societal divide in Taiwan. 
 
Table 2.  Taiwan data 
  Polarization Index  Ns  Fragmentation Index 
2008   4.92   1.75   0.43 
2012   3.96   2.24   0.55 
2016   3.57   2.18   0.54 
2018   4.10   2.17   0.54 
2020   4.07   2.47   0.60 
Source: TEDS 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020; TIGCR 201; Central Election Commission; and author’s own 
calculation 
 
Hsiao (2014) suggests that polarization in Taiwan has increased since 2000 and data 
from table 2 most definitely corroborates that.  Except for 2016 where PI is 3.57, 
Taiwan’s PI score has stayed close to 4.0.  With the CSES average at 3.25, Taiwan’s 
polarization is considered high.  This high polarization index scores are paired with 
lower effective number of parliamentary parties (approximately 2.0) as well as lower 
fragmentation index.  These figures would indicate that there is an increasing party 
cohesion within two party camps.   
                                               
4 New Zealand First was out of parliament from 2008-2011 but have held seats in all other NZ 
parliaments under MMP.  Together with the Greens, New Zealand First can be considered a small 
party. 
5 Voters weighted position on the economic development and environmental protection spectrum is 
5.90. 
6 Voters weighted position on the independence-unification spectrum is 4.54.   
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Figure 3. Voter placement of New Zealand political parties 
 
  Greens   Lab  NZ First  Nat ACT 
Left (0)    Center (5.5)    Right (11) 
 
Source: NZES 2014; Electoral Commission, and author’s calculation 
 
Dalton (2008) points out “to the extent that political parties are supposed to be 
channels of expression that allow citizens to vote their preferences, then party system 
polarization substantially strengthens this process” (p. 916; Sartori 1976).  That is, 
party system polarization can provide a better match between preference and choice 
for the electorate.  He argues, though, that fractionalization of the party system has 
less impact on this particular relationship but admits that the number of parties is a 
good representation of party diversity.  Yet, we can argue that if preferences are 
diverse and choices are equally diverse then it follows that there is a likelihood that 
preferences can be better matched and paired with the choices available.   
In corollary to this, it follows that if preferences are diverse and choices are limited, 
the match will be poorer.7 
 
In comparing the New Zealand and Taiwan data, we can see that both countries share 
a high level of party polarization but diverge in the effective number of parties and 
fragmentation.  New Zealand’s high PI is accompanied by an equally fractionalized 
party system.  Figure 3 is the voter placement of New Zealand political parties from 
the New Zealand Election Study 2014 survey.  The visual representation of the 
placement of NZ’s parties show that the party system is clearly polarized.  However, 
because there are more political parties the multiplicity of preferences is better 
matched with the number of available political party choices. 
 
The situation is not similar for Taiwan as the data table 2 can attest.   In this instance, 
the greater polarization of the party system in Taiwan is not equally matched by the 
number of party choices, although the 2020 data seem to indicate a deviation from the 
past that there is a marginal increase in party system fractionalization.  Overall, 
despite the high level of polarization supposedly offering distinct positions, party 
system polarization in this case only serves to accentuate the clear differences 
between the two parties without providing more choices to the electorate.8  
 
Polarization can also be observed in the level of party cohesion (Hetherington 2011) 
especially in the legislature.  In the case of the United States, there has been an 
increasing trend of parties now more clearly far apart that in the past.  Using DW-
Nominate scores developed by Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal and applying it for 
members of the House of Representatives in 2005-2006, Hetherington (2011) shows 
                                               
7 A consumer analogy to the preference and choice issues is a consumer’s car buying experience.  
Consumer color preferences are more varied than the color choices that the car manufacturer can offer.  
In this instance, consumers pick a color closest to their preference.  The fewer the choices available, the 
more consumers have to ‘compromise’ from their preferred color. 
8 One way to view the dynamics of polarization and fragmentation of the party system is that in high 
levels of polarization and fragmentation political parties and voters are spread across the ideological 
spectrum that can ameliorate the distinctness due to the presence of ‘bridge’ parties.  In a low 
fragmentation party system, higher level of polarization accentuates the distinctness as the two parties 
in the absence of ‘linking’ or ‘bridge’ parties. 
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Democrats clearly on the left and Republicans on the right with no overlap of the 
ideology of the members. 
 
Using measures of party cohesion in the legislature, Sheng (2008) and Sheng and 
Huang (2016) show that since the first party turnover for the presidency in Taiwan, 
party cohesion is on the rise and that roll-call voting in the Legislative Yuan are 
increasingly becoming a thing of the past as the majority party in the Legislative 
Yuan has been able to successfully shepherd its bills to its final reading.  
 
Table 3 is from Sheng’s 2008 article that shows the changes in party cohesion in the 
Legislative Yuan from the 1996 to 2008.  The general observation that one can make 
is the obvious increase in party cohesion from 1996 to 2008.  More interesting, 
however, is the fact that of the two major parties the DPP’s party cohesion is 
consistently high.  Since 2000, DPP’s party cohesion has stayed above 0.85.  The 
KMT, on the other hand, has low levels of cohesion prior to 2002 and then slowly 
increased from 2002 onwards.   
 
Table 3. Party Cohesion in Taiwan 
LY Term  KMT DPP NP PFP TSU 
 
3rd (1996-1999) 0.50 0.76 0.68  
4th (1999-2000) 0.32 0.66 0.44 
4th (2000-2002) 0.32 0.85 0.47 0.57 
5th (2002-2005) 0.68 0.86  0.86 0.69 
6th (2005-2008) 0.90 0.93  0.74 0.85 
Source: Sheng 2008, p. 25 
 
In Taiwan’s semi-presidential system, the separate survival and separate origin of the 
legislature operates more like the US Congress and unlike a Westminster 
parliamentary system.  This is especially true of the KMT members where the low 
level of party cohesion also indicates relatively poorer party discipline amongst a host 
of other reasons that other scholars have pointed to.  For our purposes, it is sufficient 
to point out that the increasing party polarization is clearly a consequence of the KMT 
becoming more ideologically homogenized internally (Paulson 2014).  From the data 
provided by Sheng (2008), since the 5th Legislative Yuan, the two major parties have 
become more cohesive.  The high level of party cohesion and internal homogenization 
of the two major parties certainly contribute to party system polarization which 
concurs with Hsiao’s (2014) observation. 
 
Table 4. Degree of Party Opposition/Antagonism on Roll-Call Voting 
LY Terms  80% party vote 90% party vote    
3rd (1996-1999)  22.40   16.50 
4th (1999-2000)  17.00     0.40 
4th (2000-2002)    7.40     9.60 
5th (2002-2005)  31.80   14.40 
6th (2005-2008)  12.50   76.60 
Source: Sheng 2008, p. 28 
 
Table 4 also from Sheng (2008) provides another view of the increasingly cohesive 
party as shown by the party line voting.  In Table 4, I only showed the top level of 
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party vote where at least 80% of the one party’s members stand in opposition to at 
least 80% of the other party’s members.  It is very clear that since the 3rd Legislative 
Yuan, the KMT and the DPP has become more cohesive as evidence by their roll-call 
voting.   
 
Sheng and Huang (2016) provided another viewpoint of the increasing cohesion of 
Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan through the use of party negotiation mechanism for 
legislative bills.  In this excellent work, Sheng and Huang (2016) show that in the 8th 
Legislative Yuan from 2012-2016, there is a decline in the use of roll-call voting as 
party cohesion and party line voting have increased.  The increasing strength of party 
line voting certainly solidifies the view of polarization in Taiwan. 
 
In the case of New Zealand, since the introduction of MMP in 1996, party vote is a 
standard feature of New Zealand parliamentary politics.  Table 5 shows the number of 
party votes as opposed to personal votes in the New Zealand House of 
Representatives.  In the New Zealand parliament when a party vote is held the votes 
are cast as a block by party representatives of the recognized parties in the House of 
Representatives.  A personal vote is cast when the issue is considered a conscience 
issue as determined by the Speaker of the House. 
 
Table 5. Numbers of Party Votes versus Personal Votes in NZ since 1996 
Term of Parliament                    Party Personal Total Party Votes/Total (%) 
 
45th Parliament: 1996–1999      1,443 40  1,483  97.3 
46th Parliament: 1999–2002      2,496 54  2,550  97.9   
47th Parliament: 2002–2005      3,428 116  3,544  96.7  
48th Parliament: 2005–2008      1,187 8  1,195  99.3 
49th Parliament: 2008–2011      2,672 7  2,679  99.7 
50th Parliament: 2011–2014      1,370 35  1,405  97.5 
Source: New Zealand Parliament, Journals of the House of Representatives: [1996–1999] 3 JHR 1334; 
[1999–2002] 3 JHR 1670; [2002–2005] 4 JHR 2243; [2005–2008] 3 JHR 1341; [2008–2011] 3 JHR 
1377; [2011–2014] 3 JHR 943; author’s calculation. 
 
Clearly, in the case of the New Zealand parliament party vote is the norm and 
personal votes are the exception as shown in table 5.  Since the adoption of MMP 
beginning the 45th Parliament, the percentage of party votes is consistently above 96 
percent and in the case of the 49th Parliament nearly 100 percent.  In New Zealand’s 
parliament ‘crossing the aisle’ to vote with the ‘other’ party is extremely rare as 
evidenced by the above table. 
 
The difference between the New Zealand and Taiwan cases is that legislative party 
cohesion is a constant and generally accepted feature of New Zealand parliamentary 
politics.  For Taiwan, party cohesion is not a constant feature of Taiwan’s legislative 
politics.  Using the data provided by Sheng (2008) as replicated in table 4, shows that 
party cohesion and party voting only became a feature more recently.  It is important 
to note here that even the highest category in Sheng’s (2008) measure of party 
cohesion shows an opposition between 90 percent of the KMT versus 90 percent of 
the DPP which is not exactly equivalent to the party vote in New Zealand’s House of 
Representatives where party vote means a block vote (all members of parliament of 
the party voting together).  As party cohesion and ideological distinctions are 
accepted feature of New Zealand’s parliamentary politics, partisan polarization does 
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not carry a negative stigma as such which is different from Taiwan’s situation (Hsiao 
2014). 
 
Besides parliamentary party cohesion that supports the view of party polarization, we 
can also view it from the vantage point of the electorate.  How do voters see 
themselves in the their own country’s ideological spectrum?  Figure 3 and figure 4 are 
the ideological self-placement of New Zealand voters and Taiwanese voters.  For 
figure 3, I used the 2014 and 2017 New Zealand Election Study survey data to 
construct the voter distribution along the left-right scale.  For figure 4, I used the 
Taiwan Election and Democratization Study survey data for 2008, 2012, 2016, and 
2020 to construct the voter distribution along the independence-unification scale.   
 
 
Source: NZES 2014, 2017 and author’s calculation 
 
The self-placement of New Zealand electorate in the NZES surveys for 2014 and 
2017 are quite curious ones given the general impression that New Zealand voters are 
more left of center rather than slightly right of center.  While there seems to be a 
general self-identification as right of center from 2014 and 2017, data on figure 3 
seem to indicate that New Zealanders perceive themselves to be center or center-right. 
The 2014 election was won by the center-right National Party where voters place it at 
7.08 in the continuum.  The 2017 election resulted in the National Party gaining a 
plurality of parliamentary seats but unable to form a majority coalition leading to a 
Labour-led coalition with the centrist New Zealand First and leftist Greens. 
 
In terms of how the average voters relate to the two major parties – Labour and 
National – table 6 provides another perspective on the gap between the mean voter 
position on the left-right scale and the two major parties.  In 2014, the weighted mean 
voter position on the left-right scale is at 5.76 (quite centrist).  This position moved 
slightly to the left in 2017 at 5.23.  However, in 2014 voters place Labour at 3.23 and 
National at 7.08 showing that the average voters feels closer to National (gap of 1.32) 
than to Labour (2.53).  Indeed, National Party won this election and formed the 
government.  Considering these two poles of New Zealand politics, then, the total gap 























Table 6.  NZ voter self-placement on L-R scale vis-à-vis two major parties 
 
  Voter LAB NAT LAB-Voter Voter-NAT Distance 
 
2014  5.76 3.23 7.08 2.53  1.32  3.85 
 
2017  5.23 3.83 7.29 1.40  2.06  3.46 
Source: NZES 2014, 2017 and author’s calculation 
 
In 2017, the voters moved slightly left to a weighted mean position of 5.23, while 
voters perceived that Labour moved right to 3.83 while National moved further right 
to 7.29.  This time around voters’ gap with Labour shrunk to 1.40 while the gap with 
National increased to 2.06.  This evidence supports the actual election result with 
Labour able to form a majority coalition and ended its nine-year drought in forming 
government.  The total perceived gap between the voters and the two major parties 
was reduced to 3.46 from its levels in 2014.  The evidence in figure 3 and table 7 
corroborate Satherley et al’s (2020, p. 17) finding that while New Zealanders became 
“slightly more ideologically sorted over time, there is little evidence of social sorting 
by party vote.” 
 
 
Source: TEDS 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and author’s calculation 
 
 
Figure 4 is the self-placement of Taiwanese voters on the independence-unification 
scale.  The centrist position here is a preference for status quo (neither independence 
nor unification).  Taiwanese voters status quo position has been quite consistent over 
the years with the most recent TEDS surveys showing over 45 percent of the voters.  
The relatively large drop from the 2016 to the 2020 figures is likely an effect of the 
Hong Kong pro-democracy protests and China’s strong reaction to the supposed ‘one 
country, two systems’ model.  Except for the position of outright independence that 
command above 10 percent of the electorate, all other positions in the continuum 



























Table 7.  Taiwan voter self-placement on I-U scale vis-à-vis two major parties 
 
  Voter DPP KMT DPP-Voter Voter-KMT Distance 
 
2008  4.54 2.17 7.41 2.37  2.87  5.24 
2012  4.54 2.59 7.04 1.95  2.50  4.45  
2016  5.02 3.13 7.37 1.89  2.35  4.24 
2020  3.89 2.52 7.48 1.37  3.59  4.96 
Source: TEDS 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and author’s calculation 
 
Table 7 shows how the Taiwanese voters relate to the two major parties on the 
independence versus unification scale.  The 2020 weighted mean voter position is 
quite a drastic change from prior positions.  From 2008 up until the most recent 
national elections, the mean voter position is definitely closer to the status quo 
position.  As mentioned earlier, the 2020 voter position may have been affected by 
events in Hong Kong and China especially the pro-democracy protest movement in 
Hong Kong.  Looking at the gap between voter position and party position, it is clear 
from table 7 that the DPP and voters’ gap has been decreasing over time.  The 2020 
figures show such a large gap between how voters relate to the DPP and the KMT 
with voters being a lot closer to the DPP than to the KMT.  The KMT has lost two 
consecutive presidential and legislative elections in 2016 and 2020.  Yet, KMT is still 
(for now) the second largest party in parliament.  So just looking at the two major 
parties, the gap from the electorate position to the two major parties have remained 
consistently high.  In 2008, the combined gap was 5.24 and dropped in both 2012 and 
2016 only to increase again to 4.96 in 2020. 
 
Comparing the New Zealand data on table 6 and the Taiwan data on table 7 provide 
interesting observations.  In terms of the electorate’s perception of the two major 
parties in their respective party systems, Taiwanese voters view their two major 
parties are farther apart while New Zealander voters view their two large parties as 
closer to them.  With the absence of credible party choices, the polarization becomes 
amplified.  
 
In this section we compared New Zealand and Taiwan on various features of political 
polarization.  The data presented certainly support the view of high levels of party 
system polarization for both countries, yet there are nuanced differences.  In 
comparing the two countries, we find that there are differences in the dynamics 
between polarization and fractionalization, consistent and lengthy experience of high 
level of party voting in the legislature, as well as the ideological gap between voters 
and the two major parties.  These nuanced differences may have contributed to the 




William Crotty (2014, p.1) avers that, “polarization is a term meant to describe the 
condition of hyper-partisanship/ideological extremism, policy representational 
imbalance, and institutional paralysis that combine to make contemporary governing 
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so problematic.”9 While Lupu (2015) suggests that party polarization have desirable 
outcomes such as increased voter turnout, more consistent ideological voting, and 
clear electoral options and choices for the citizens.  In this exploratory study, I asked 
why there is such a variation in sentiments regarding political polarization.   
 
To offer some insights regarding this difference in sentiments, I examined two 
democracies that have high level of party system polarization – Taiwan and New 
Zealand.  In New Zealand, polarization is part and parcel of parliamentary politics.   
Political parties are expected to be ideologically distinct and cohesive.  In Taiwan, 
polarization has been observed to be increasing since 2000 and is noted with certain 
amount of concern by scholars and observers (Hsiao 2014).  Viewing polarization 
from the placement of parties along ideological continuum, the fractionalization of the 
party system, legislative party cohesion, and voters’ position vis-à-vis the political 
parties, we are able to form some tentative inferences to explain why there is less 
concern in New Zealand for polarization vis-à-vis Taiwan.   
 
Needless to say, this exploratory study is only an initial and incomplete attempt at 
uncovering why there are such different views about polarization.  Much remains to 
be done for us to strengthen the inferences made in this exploratory study.  Besides a 
more systematic and rigorous test of the propositions, other factors (e.g. institutional 








                                               
9 Crotty’s concerns about the negative consequences of polarization seem to be exaggerated especially 
in the New Zealand situation.  In the Taiwan case, institutional paralysis occurred under divided 
government and less so in periods when executive and legislature are controlled by the same party.  In 
this study, I have not examined the differences between fusion of power versus separate power systems 
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